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BOOK INTRODUCTION
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The 1990s were an amazing time to be in Southeast Asia. There was so
much growth, so much hope and energy in the air, it felt like the entire
region was on fire. Certainly the economies were. The “Asian tigers” were
in the midst of a raging boom that was rapidly transforming them into
industrial societies. And Thailand was outpacing them all: from 1986
to 1996 its economy expanded by an average of 8 percent every year. With
an open and vibrant society, a free press (at least for the written word;
television is much less free), and a government actively engaged not
only with its neighbors but the world at large, Thailand, in the words
of one UN Development Program officer, was “a great success story”.
It’s also the country with which I am most familiar, so it takes
center stage in A Land On Fire, although I will examine issues in neighboring
countries, as well, and survey the response to key issues throughout
Southeast Asia.
If you’ve never been to Thailand, but happen to be familiar with
Europe, think of it as “the Italy of Asia”. There are some
startling similarities between the two countries, both superficial and
profound. Like the Italians, Thais are famous for their beauty and elegance,
for their delicious cuisine and their insatiable appetite for fun and
passion, for the splendor of their ancient traditions and the depths
of their corruption, the continual changing of their governments and
their disparities in income and power, their religious devotion and reckless
debauchery, their grace and glitz, style and squalor, and of course their
cities’ ceaseless traffic jams.
During the Southeast Asian boom, it was in the cities where Thailand’s
rapid development was concentrated, particularly in the chaotic capital of
Bangkok. This sprawling megalopolis grew so fast its skies were filled with
cranes--not the avian kind, but the towering metallic sort--which flocked to
the country in droves: early in the decade, some civil engineers estimated
that around 15-20 percent of all the world’s cranes could be found in
Thailand. All that growth, combined with the opening up of neighboring Indochina
after decades of strife and isolation, gave the entire region an incredible
dynamism. The surge of excitement in Bangkok was almost palpable, as if the
roaring economic inferno had ignited a flame of unbridled optimism, as if an
entire city had come to feel there were no limits to the possibilities before
it.
Inevitably, however, there was also a dark side to this dash for prosperity.
For while Bangkok’s skyline soared during the boom, its streets
have become choked with cars, its canals turned into sewers and its air
transformed into a nasty, steaming soup of dust and toxins. And those
are only the most visible manifestation of the environmental catastrophe
that is Thailand today. Virtually every resource the country owns has
been squandered with too little thought for the future. The forests which
40 years ago covered 60 percent of the country now probably cover only
15 percent, and their amazingly rich biodiversity has become endangered
before it could even be fully recorded. Wanton use of pesticides has
poisoned the countryside, shrimp farms have ravaged the coasts, and the
seas have been plundered of their fish.
These disastrous side effects of industrialization and urbanization
are not unprecedented, however. The situation in Bangkok (or Jakarta
or Shanghai or Mexico City) today is probably quite similar to that of
Dickensian England or turn-of-the-20th-Century New York, and overall
the developed countries (the “global North”) have done far
more to transform the global environment than those in the developing
world (the “global South”). There are even some positive
environmental signs in Southeast Asia, for instance a rapid decline in
population growth, thanks largely to improved educational opportunities
for women and a competent public health service, supported by a thriving
community of non-governmental organizations.
But in general, the region’s rampant growth has been unsustainable,
and although the financial crisis which rocked Southeast Asia beginning
in 1997 was harsher than generally expected, many observers felt that
a pause in the rapid pace of development was not only predictable, but
probably necessary.
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